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Toward a Principled Statutory Approach
to Supplemental Jurisdiction in Diversity
of Citizenship Casest
RICHARD D. FREER*
1. INTRODUCTION
The supplemental-jurisdiction statute' has been on the books for eight years.
Congress stated that its goals in passing the statute were to overrule Finley v.
United States2 and, in other respects, to restore pre-Finley practice.' Laudably,
the statute achieved the first of these goals.' In other particulars, however, as
evidenced by and in this Symposium, there is widespread agreement that the
statute must be amended. Indeed, after two years of study, The American Law
Institute ("ALI") has proffered an amended statute.' Although several facets of
§ 1367 deserve attention,' I focus on the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in
diversity of citizenship cases.
Section 1367(b) changes pre-Finley practice by restricting supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity cases in two ways. First, it limits supplemental
jurisdiction over claims asserted by a plaintiff acting in a defensive capacity.
Second, it precludes supplemental jurisdiction over claims by or against an
intervenor of right. At the same time, though, the statute may expand
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases in two ways. First, some courts
conclude that § 1367 overrules the holding in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,'
t © 1998 Richard D. Freer
* Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University. I am grateful to Tom Arthur
for helpful discussion and comments.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990).
2. 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (rejecting pendent parties jurisdiction over state law claims
asserted against a nondiverse defendant in a Federal Tort Claims Act case).
3. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874.
4. The statute also overruled the equally lamentable result in Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976), in which the Court rejected pendent parties jurisdiction in a case involving a
nonexclusive federal question jurisdiction.
5. See AMERICAN LAW INsTrrUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT,
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2 (1998). I serve as an Adviser to the ALI Federal Judicial Code
Project. Of course, the views expressed in this Article are solely mine. Although I have not
hesitated to criticize the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, see, for example, Richard D. Freer,
Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991), my experience as an Adviser on the ALI
Project has given me a much greater appreciation for the difficulty of drafting legislation.
6. For example, there may be concern with the statement of the scope of the grant of
supplemental jurisdiction, the circumstances justifying discretionary refusal to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, the operation of supplemental jurisdiction in cases removed from
state court, and the application of supplemental jurisdiction in alienage cases.
7. For general discussion of these two restrictions, see Freer, supra note 5, at 479-84.
8. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). The restrictions and confusion about Zahn were noted in Freer,
supra note 5, at 475-86.
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and permits class members whose claims do not satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement.9 Similarly, some courts hold that the statute overrules the nonclass
analog of Zahn, Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,'" to permit joinder of plaintiffs whose
claims fail to meet the amount in controversy requirement." Second, in the same
vein, the statute contains what three respected commentators call a "potentially
gaping hole"'2 that could eviscerate the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge
v. Curtiss.3
One of the most compelling arguments for revising § 1367 is to resolve the
uncertainty about the continued viability of Strawbridge and the split of authority
over whether all claimants must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.
While doing so, Congress should reassess the appropriate rule as to supplemental
jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs acting in a defensive capacity and over
claims by and against intervenors of right.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATUTE
Congress passed the supplemental-jurisdiction statute in response to Finley. In
Finley the Supreme Court precluded pendent parties jurisdiction in a case arising
under the Federal Tort Claims Act,'5 which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal courts. As a result, the plaintiff in Finley was required to pursue her claim
against the United States in federal court and her transactionally related state law
claim against a utility company in state court. It would be impossible to devise a
rule more wasteful of personal and judicial resources. More disturbing in the long
run, however, was the Court's rejection of its traditional presumption that
supplemental jurisdiction applied (over claims satisfying the constitutional nexus
test) in the absence of legislation.' 6 Before Finley, the Court had permitted
supplemental jurisdiction over related claims unless Congress provided
9. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995).
10. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
11. See, e.g., Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc. 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.
1996).
12. Thomas Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental
Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 961 n.91 (1991).
13. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). It is worth noting that the statute might overrule Zahn,
Clark and Strawbridge only in cases involving a single defendant. Once a plaintiff's claim
invokes diversity jurisdiction, § 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by
other plaintiffs (or class members) whose claims meet the nexus requirement constituting part
of the same case or controversy as that claim. Section 1367(b) is relevant because the original
claim invoked diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. That subsection precludes supplemental
jurisdiction over particular claims, including claims by plaintiffs against persons joined under
Rule 20. Rule 20 prescribes the requirements forjoinder of multiple parties. Accordingly, if
the plaintiffs' claims are against a single defendant, nothing in § 1367(b) precludes the
supplemental jurisdiction granted by § 1367(a). See 4 RICHARD D. FREER, MooRE's FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE § 20.07[3] (3d ed. 1998).
14. Not all lower courts agree that the statute overrules the result in Zahn and Clark. See,
e.g., Mayo v. Key Fin. Servs., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass. 1993); see also supra notes 7-
8.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. 111996).
16. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 5, at 464-69.
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otherwise; it presumed that Congress permitted it unless Congress precluded it. 7
In Finley, however, the Court took a different tack, opining that supplemental
jurisdiction required an affirmative grant by Congress." Taken for all its worth,
this change in position threatened all supplemental jurisdiction in diversity of
citizenship cases, because no statute granted it in such cases."
Congress could have crafted a statute overruling the result in Finley by granting
pendent claim and party jurisdiction in federal question cases, leaving the rest of
supplemental jurisdiction to case law. In retrospect, this course may have worked,
since, as it turns out, Finley did not have much of an impact beyond its facts. In
the wake of Finley, not a single court refused to permit supplemental jurisdiction
over compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, or claims by or against an
intervenor of right. Indeed, the appellate courts uniformly continued to recognize
supplemental jurisdiction over impleader claims, despite the fact that such claims
(like the pendent parties assertion in Finley) involve joinder of an additional
party. °
On the other hand, Finley created sufficient confusion to justify Congress's
ultimate decision to proceed with a statute that addressed the entire universe of
supplemental jurisdiction. In my opinion, that decision locks future efforts into
the same statutory model of granting supplemental jurisdiction broadly and then
cutting back on it in prescribed circumstances in diversity cases. I am aware that
some observers favor a statute reposing discretion in the district judge to
determine when supplemental jurisdiction should apply. To me, such an approach
is ill-founded. First, courts are not used to exercising discretion in this manner.2
For nearly a decade, they have been operating under a statute that dictates an
answer for every conceivable circumstance. Second, and more importantly,
subject matter jurisdiction rules ought to be as clear as possible. It is difficult to
17. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (rejecting
supplemental jurisdiction on the theory that Congress precluded it); Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976) (disallowing supplemental jurisdiction under the same theory).
18. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989).
19. For an excellent discussion of this possibility, see Wendy C. Perdue, Finley v. United
States: Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction, 76 VA. L. REV. 539, 540 (1990).
20. See Alumax Mill Prods., Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1990);
King Fisher Marine Serv. Inc. v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 893 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1990). In one
case, a district judge noted the issue of whether Finley should affect the traditional rule in
impleader, but did not rule on the issue. See Community Coffee Co. v. M/S Kriti Amethyst,
715 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. La. 1989). The only court to refuse supplemental jurisdiction over an
impleader claim completely missed this point and mistakenly concluded that the court in
Community Coffee had rejected supplemental jurisdiction. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Spartan Mechanical Corp., 738 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). One academic figure similarly
misread Community Coffee in making his point that codification was necessary. See Thomas
M. Mengler, The Demise ofPendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 247, 259
& n.65. With these exceptions, the clear post-Finley consensus was that supplemental
jurisdiction applied to impleader claims. See, e.g., Huberman v. Duane Fellows, Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
21. 1 am not speaking here of the discretionary refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
for various reasons such as dismissal of the underlying federal claim, issues now addressed in
§ 1367(c). Instead, I speak of proposals envisioning the judge's discretionary assessment as to
whether supplemental jurisdiction should attach ab initio.
1998]
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conceive of a more wasteful enterprise than litigating over whether the parties are
in the right court. This is an area for hard-and-fast rules; leaving the matter to the
court's discretion opens the door to having like cases treated differently and to
wasteful litigation over whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.22
In other words, the fact that reasonable people may disagree about where a
statute ought to draw lines does not indict the statutory model employed by
Congress. Thus, I applaud the ALI decision to follow the same format as the
present § 1367. Hopefully, through widespread discussion and careful
amendment, the statute can strike the proper balance between the conflicting
impulses of the complete diversity rule and supplemental jurisdiction.
III. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
FOR DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION IN DIVERSITY CASES
It is important to remember that supplemental jurisdiction does not operate in
a vacuum. It facilitates the inclusive packaging of related parties and claims
envisioned by the joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By
permitting joinder of claims transactionally related to the underlying dispute,
supplemental jurisdiction brings substantial benefits to litigants and the judicial
system.23 But efficient packaging is not the sole concern. If it were, Congress
could simply grant supplemental jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitution.
Such a plenary grant of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases, however,
would override the complete diversity rule and vastly expand the caseload of the
federal courts. So retention of the complete diversity rule requires that § 1367
impose restrictions on supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases.
If the slate is now clean, though, must we adhere to the complete diversity rule?
Some supporters of diversity jurisdiction might argue for the rejection of
Strawbridge.24 Although I am an ardent supporter of diversity jurisdiction, as a
matter of political reality, I believe that Congress will never abolish the complete
diversity rule for general diversity cases. At any rate, the debate over amendment
of § 1367 is not the time to take up such a radical shift in jurisdiction. Doing so
22. Moreover, note that the Supreme Court rejected discretion of a different sort in favor
of a hard-and-fast rule. In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978),
the Court held that a claim by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant could not invoke
supplemental jurisdiction. The Court was concerned that such a plaintiff could conceivably use
such a claim to create jurisdiction which would not exist as an original matter, but declined to
treat the issue under the collusive joinder statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994). Thus, instead of
leaving the question to case-by-case discretionary assessment, the Court imposed a bright-line
rule.
23. Many commentators have discussed the benefits of inclusive packaging. See, e.g.,
Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the
Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PrIT. L. REV. 809 (1989); John C. McCoid,
A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1976); Edward F. Sherman,
Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231 (1991).
24. 1 was quite surprised that several professors at the Association of American Law
Schools Symposium in San Francisco expressed support for abolishing the complete diversity
rule.
[Vol. 74:5
PRINCIPLED STATUTORYAPPROACH
will simply mire the debate on § 1367 and delay ameliorative change. In my view,
we should recognize that supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases must be
limited to preserve the complete diversity rule from ready evasion.
Just as those who favor diversity jurisdiction must accept limits, so its critics
must realize that they have lost the battle on wholesale abolition of diversity. That
being the case, it is inappropriate to use back-door methods-such as unnecessary
restrictions on supplemental jurisdiction-to make diversity less attractive to
litigants. Precluding the use of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases will
bring one of two deleterious effects: it will either create overlapping litigation in
federal and state court or it will cause the plaintiff to eschew the federal forum to
achieve unitary adjudication in state court. 25 Many anti-diversity commentators
would applaud the latter, and Congress certainly could impose draconian
restrictions on supplemental jurisdiction to reduce the diversity docket. If that is
the goal, however, it should be forthrightly stated and debated as such.
I come to the task, then, with two underlying assumptions. First, diversity of
citizenship is a legitimate head of federal jurisdiction. Second, it is properly
limited by the complete diversity rule. Thus, for starters, § 1367 must be amended
to close the "potentially gaping hole'2 6 in Strawbridge. But what of the other
difficult areas of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases? The answer should
be informed by the policies underlying diversity jurisdiction and the complete
diversity rule.
Although the issue has been debated for two centuries, the general view is that
diversity jurisdiction is intended to provide an impartial tribunal, free from local
bias or influence, to decide controversies between citizens of different states.
In other words, it gives a nonlocal litigant access to a federal court, to avoid
being "hometowned" in litigation with a local litigant.2" Notwithstanding strong
attacks, diversity jurisdiction and its historic justification have remained intact
since 1789.29
The complete diversity rule, the product of the Strawbridge case, limits
diversity by requiring that all plaintiffs be citizens of different states from all
defendants. Although the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction has never
mentioned complete diversity, there is no doubt that it is a statutory limitation.30
In theory, the rule assumes that "the presence of [co-citizens] on both sides of a
25. See Martin H. Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of
Analyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 1378, 1395-96 (1985) (stating that a plaintiff
unable to achieve packaging in federal court will be tempted to abandon the federal forum).
26. Rowe et al., supra note 12, at 961 n.91.
27. See generally 15 MARTIN H. REDISH, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.03 (3d ed.
1998).
28. This being the case, it is difficult to justify allowing any plaintiff to file in federal court
in the state of her citizenship.
29. Of course, the statute granting general diversity of citizenship jurisdiction has been
amended several times, often with the goal of limiting the number of diversity cases filed. But
in none of these adjustments has Congress indicated disagreement with the underlying rationale
supporting the grant.
30. See 15 REDISH, supra note 27, § 102.12, at 102-21.
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case will neutralize any possibility of bias affecting litigants from other states.",3'
Thus, if a citizen of Massachusetts sued two defendants, one a citizen of
Massachusetts and the other a citizen of Vermont, the complete diversity rule
would preclude diversity jurisdiction. Again, the assumption is that the Vermont
defendant does not need the neutral federal forum because she is a coparty with
one who is a co-citizen of the plaintiff. Although the assumption is not above
criticism,32 it remains part of the diversity landscape. 3
The Supreme Court took an extraordinary step to protect the complete diversity
rule from evisceration in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.3 ' There, the
Court established a blanket rule that there can be no supplemental jurisdiction
over a plaintiff s claim, asserted under Rule 14(a), against a nondiverse third-
party defendant who had been impleaded by the defendant. Kroger was one of the
rare instances in which pre-Finley practice rejected supplemental jurisdiction 35
over claims satisfying the nexus test of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.6 In
Kroger, the Iowa plaintiff sued a Nebraska defendant, which then impleaded an
Iowa third-party defendant. Plaintiff asserted a claim against the third-party
defendant, seeking to invoke ancillary jurisdiction. The trial court entered
summary judgment on the plaintiff's original claim against the defendant, so the
actual dispute, as it developed, was between Iowa citizens. The Court rejected
supplemental jurisdiction and the case was dismissed.37
The Court was concerned that a clever plaintiff could sue a diverse defendant,
knowing that it would implead a third-party defendant who was a co-citizen of the
3 1. David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 18 (1968).
32. After all, if the stated case were brought in a Massachusetts state court biased against
outsiders, the Vermont defendant is not protected by the fact that she has a Massachusetts
codefendant In fact, "home cooking" might result in the Vermonter's being held liable for the
entire judgment.
33. Another justification for the complete diversity rule, of course, is docket control. As
Professor Redish has observed, however, there is no logical relationship between the complete
diversity rule and docket control. See 15 REDISH, supra note 27, § 102.12, at 102-23. "Apart
from its obvious historical pedigree, it is unclear that the complete diversity requirement is any
more rational a means of curbing diversity jurisdiction than an approach premised on the basis
of a litigant's astrological sign." Id.
34. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
35. Before Finley, courts uniformly permitted supplemental jurisdiction. over claims
satisfying Gibbs, whether asserted by defendants, plaintiffs, or intervenors of right, except in
the pendent parties area, Aldinger, the Kroger situation, and over claims by or against
necessary parties. See generally Freer, supra note 5, at 449-64.
36. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
37. An interesting aside: the plaintiff in Kroger took advantage of an Iowa savings statute
to refile her case against the erstwhile third-party defendant. By the time she did so, she had
established citizenship in Texas, so she was able to invoke diversity jurisdiction in the same
court in which she originally filed! Apparently, the parties ultimately settled the case. See
RiCHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CivI. PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
QUESTIONS 763 (2d ed. 1997).
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plaintiff." With supplemental jurisdiction over the latter claim, the plaintiff
would be able to evade Strawbridge and proceed directly against the nondiverse
party. The majority rejected the dissent's contention that any such behavior could
be treatedl as collusive joinder. 9 Certainly, there was no evidence of such
gamesmanship in Kroger itself.4" Moreover, Kroger was not the typical case-the
initial claim against the defendant had been dismissed, leaving only the claim
between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant; without supplemental
jurisdiction, nothing remained in federal court. In the more typical case, that
claim would be one of three remaining before the court,4' and the claim brought
in by supplemental jurisdiction would play a more ancillary role than it would
have in Kroger.
While there is much to criticize in the majority opinion in Kroger, and the
wisdom of a blanket prohibition can be questioned, we have lived with the Kroger
limitation for two decades-under both the common law and statutory regimes.
Politically, it would be very difficult to abolish it in a revised § 1367. Beyond the
political reality, however, even a Kroger critic 42 can admit that the holding of the
case was not irrational. Reasonable people can conclude that exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim by the plaintiff against the third-party
defendant could open the door to evasion of the complete diversity rule in a not
insignificant number of cases.
While I would prefer a less draconian solution, I, for one, could accept a
blanket prohibition against supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. We should
realize, however, that accepting Kroger does impair efficient joinder in federal
court and thus hampers the efficacy of diversity jurisdiction. That cost is
acceptable, however, for the benefit of protecting Strawbridge from a colorable
threat of evasion.
The problem with § 1367 is that it reaches much farther than Kroger. It
precludes supplemental jurisdiction over claims for which it was routinely
exercised in pre-Finley practice and, more importantly, imposes restrictions not
necessary to protect the complete diversity rule from realistic threat. By doing so,
§ 1367 unduly restricts efficient joinder in diversity cases.
38. The Court also opined that supplemental jurisdiction usually was invoked over claims
by parties acting in a defensive capacity, a point to which we will return below. See infra text
accompanying notes 41-53.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994).
40. Indeed, it was not until trial that the plaintiff discovered the lack of diversity between
herself and the third-party defendant. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 369 (1978).
41. Namely, (1) the original claim against the defendant, (2) the impleader claim by the
defendant against the third-party defendant, and (3) the claim by the plaintiff against the third-
party defendant.
42. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 69-74.
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IV. SPECIFIC ISSUES OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION IN
DIVERSITY CASES
A. Claims by Plaintiff in a Defensive Capacity
Section 1367(b) precludes supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases over
claims asserted "by plaintiffs" against parties joined under Rules 14, 19, 20, and
4. Some of this is familiar ground. The reference to Rule 19 reflects the
longstanding traditional rule that claims by or against necessary parties do not
invoke supplemental jurisdiction. 4' The reference to Rule 20 seems to reflect the
familiar understanding that there is no pendent parties jurisdiction in diversity
cases, and the reference to Rule 14 seems to reflect the Kroger holding. On the
other hand, the reference to Rule 24 is an overt departure from prior practice,
which I will address below.
In addition to the reference to Rule 24, and despite the familiar ground, §
13 67(b) imposes unprecedented restrictions on a plaintiffs ability to invoke
supplemental jurisdiction, because it fails to recognize that a plaintiff may assert
some claims defensively-that is, after having a claim asserted against her. For
example, assume that the defendant asserts a counterclaim against the plaintiff
and that the plaintiff wants to implead a third-party defendant who may owe her
indemnity or contribution onthe counterclaim. If the third-party defendant is a
co-citizen of the plaintiff (or if the claim does not exceed $75,000), the impleader
claim can be asserted only through supplemental jurisdiction. Although pre-
Finley practice routinely supported supplemental jurisdiction in this situation,45
§ 1367(b) precludes it, because this is a claim by a plaintiff against "one made a
party under Rule 14. "46 The same problem befalls a plaintiff who, in response to
a counterclaim, asserts a cross-claim against a nondiverse co-plaintiff. Although
pre-Finley practice supported supplemental jurisdiction, such a claim is by a
plaintiff against "one made a party under... Rule 20" and thus runs afoul of §
1367(b).
These limitations make no sense.47 Indeed, they are contrary to the complete
diversity rule. In each situation, the plaintiff is asserting a claim against a co-
citizen-but one who is diverse from the defendant. Thus, in each, both parties
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1990).
44. See 4 FREER, supra note 13, § 19.04, at 19-70.
45. See, e.g., Brown & Caldwell v. Institute for Energy Funding, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 649,
651 (C.D. Cal. 1985). While I do not believe that pre-Finley practice should bind Congress in
considering revisions to § 1367, we should remember that Congress purported to be codifying
that practice in the present statute. See supra text accompanying note 3.
46. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Aldridge, 906 F. Supp. 866, 868-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Guaranteed Sys., Inc. v. American Nat'l Can Co., 842 F. Supp. 855, 857 (M.D.N.C. 1994)
(recognizing unfortunate result but feeling "bound by the plain terms of the statute").
47. Judge Bullock expressed this sentiment in holding that § 1367(b) precluded
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim by the plaintiff against a nondiverse third-party
defendant. See Guaranteed Sys., 842 F. Supp. at 857.
[Vol. 74:5
PRINCIPLED STATUTORYAPPROACH
on the plaintiff's side of the case (the plaintiff and the third-party defendant or the
co-plaintiff) are completely diverse from the defendant. To be sure, the plaintiff s
new claim itself could not invoke diversity jurisdiction, but after joinder of the
third-party defendant and exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, this remains a
diversity case. While there is a dispute between them, they are united in interest
against the defendant. Moreover, the impleader claim rises or falls on the
underlying dispute, which invoked diversity jurisdiction. Exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims does no violence to Strawbridge. Failing to do so,
however, imperils efficient joinder in diversity cases.
Another defensive claim by the plaintiff may present a closer question. Suppose
the defendant impleads a third-party defendant, who then asserts a claim under
Rule 14(a) against the plaintiff. Procedurally, such claims are proper if they arise
from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying dispute.48 If the third-
party defendant and the plaintiff are co-citizens, pre-Finley law permitted the
third-party defendant to invoke supplemental jurisdiction.49 The statute leads to
the same result, because nothing in § 1367(b) removes supplemental jurisdiction
over claims by third-party defendants.5 Suppose, however, that the plaintiff
asserts a compulsory counterclaim in response to the third-party defendant's Rule
14(a) claim. Should that claim invoke supplemental jurisdiction?
Courts addressing the question before Finley concluded uniformly that the
plaintiff's claim should be supported by supplemental jurisdiction." Section
1367(b) changes that result, however, and precludes supplemental jurisdiction
because this is a claim by a plaintiff against "one made a party under Rule 14."
This situation is more troublesome than the prior examples because here co-
citizens are on opposite sides of the underlying dispute. Nonetheless, this is a far
cry from Kroger, and the statute should be amended to permit supplemental
jurisdiction.
In Kroger, a plaintiff might easily foresee that the defendant would implead a
nondiverse third-party defendant. She could anticipate that move when she
invoked diversity jurisdiction by suing only the diverse defendant. In other words,
the evasion of Strawbridge depended only on the readily foreseeable action of
one other person. In the present case, however, two other people have to file
claims before the plaintiff can attempt to use supplemental jurisdiction. In other
words, the plaintiff would have to foresee not only the impleader of the third-
party defendant, but that the third-party defendant would assert a claim against
the plaintiff. Do we really think that a plaintiff, desiring to proceed in federal
court against the third-party defendant, would sue the defendant, hoping that she
would implead the third-party defendant and hoping further that the third-party
defendant would assert a claim against the plaintiff, all so the plaintiff could then
assert a compulsory counterclaim against the third-party defendant? Because the
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
49. See, e.g., Finkle v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1984);
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
50. See 3 WAYNE D. BRAziL ETAL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACICE § 14.41[4][d][iii] (3d ed.
1998).
51. See, e.g., Finkle, 744 F.2d at 1018-19; Berel Co. v. Sencit FIG McKinley Assocs., 125
F.R.D. 100, 102-03 (D.N.J. 1989).
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threat to Strawbridge is so attenuated, the policy underlying diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction and the efficiency underlying supplemental jurisdiction
ought to prevail.
Even if the plaintiff did foresee all of these machinations, refusing to allow
supplemental jurisdiction does too much violence to efficient joinder. The
plaintiff's original claim (and any counterclaim), the impleader claim, and the
third-party defendant's claim against the plaintiff are all properly before the
federal court. Yet the transactionally related claim by the plaintiff against the
third-party defendant would have to go to state court. And why? As it is noted,
not to avoid any realistic threat to Strawbridge. The case that remains in federal
court is a dispute between citizens of different states; unlike Kroger, there is a
huge "center of gravity" in federal court.
There are other important differences between this scenario and Kroger. First,
the plaintiff s claim is asserted in a defensive capacity. In rejecting supplemental
jurisdiction in Kroger itself, the Court noted that supplemental jurisdiction was
most appropriate for claims asserted by parties against whom relief had been
sought.5 2 Second, the plaintiff s claim here is a compulsory counterclaim; refusing
supplemental jurisdiction eviscerates that rule. It creates overlapping state court
litigation, and, importantly, robs the third-party defendant of the protection
intended by the compulsory counterclaim rule. The third-party defendant, who
had no role in choosing a federal forum, now must defend the impleader claim
and prosecute her claim against the plaintiff in federal court; yet, the third-party
defendant must defend a claim against her (by the plaintiff) in state court.
Some have argued that the "rationale" of Kroger might prohibit supplemental
jurisdiction for all claims by plaintiffs, even if asserted in a defensive capacity. 3
There are two problems with this assertion. First, the federal courts never found
such a broad emanation from Kroger. After the dust settled, Kroger was limited
to its facts.54 There is not a single published opinion in which a court invoked
Kroger-expressly or in spirit-to deny supplemental jurisdiction over a
compulsory counterclaim asserted by a plaintiff. Second, as noted above, a
blanket provision such as the holding in Kroger exacts a price-it hampers
efficient joinder and maims diversity jurisdiction. In the Kroger situation itself,
the Court, joined subsequently by many commentators, concluded that this price
was necessary to protect Strawbridge from ready evasion. But as we move farther
from Kroger-as we need to anticipate more parties' actions and reactions and
as we have more and more claims properly in federal court-it is increasingly
difficult to justify paying that price, especially where doing so harms litigants
who had no role in choosing the forum, whom the Kroger Court said
supplemental jurisdiction was meant to protect!
It is one thing to tell the diversity plaintiff-as Kroger did-that she will not
be able to file a Rule 14(a) claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant
impleaded by the defendant. It is quite another to tell the diversity plaintiff what
52. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978).
53. See Rowe et al., supra note 12, at 956.
54. See Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping At Burnt Straws: The Disaster of
the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMoRY L.J. 963, 975-78 (1991).
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§ 1367(b) tells her: (1) that if a claim is asserted against her, she cannot implead
a nondiverse third-party defendant who may owe her indemnity or contribution;
(2) that if a claim is asserted against her, she cannot assert a cross-claim against
a nondiverse co-plaintiff; (3) that a nondiverse third-party defendant may assert
a claim against her, but that she cannot assert a compulsory counterclaim in
response; and (4) that she cannot assert a claim against a nondiverse intervenor
or necessary party, even though their claims against her will invoke supplemental
jurisdiction. This is a formidable set of roadblocks, unknown to pre-Finley law
and unnecessary to protect the complete diversity rule.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction for Claims By and Against
Intervenors of Right
Whenever it is invoked, supplemental jurisdiction facilitates joinder and avoids
duplication of effort and the potential for inconsistent results. Strong as these
policies are, there is even stronger justification for fostering inclusive packaging
when joinder is necessary to avoid harm to the interest of an absentee. Two
joinder rules reflect this concern in virtually identical operative language. An
absentee who claims an interest relating to the subject matter of a pending case
and who is so situated that her nonjoinder may "as a practical matter impair or
impede [her] ability to protect that interest," may be joined as one "needed for a
just adjudication" under Rule 19(a)(2)(i) ss or may intervene of right under Rule
24(a)(2).6 In either event, joinder achieves not only efficiency and consistency,
but protects the interest of a nonparty from potential impairment. This protection
of the absentee is such a strong policy that it constitutes one of the situations in
which our system justifies overriding the plaintiff's party structure of the suit.s"
Historically, there were significant differences in practice when joinder of the
absentee would destroy diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Under Rule 19,
supplemental jurisdiction has not been permitted. 8 Thus, if the joinder of an
absentee who satisfies Rule 19(a)(2) would destroy subject matter jurisdiction,
the court's only options are (1) to proceed without the absentee or (2) to dismiss
the pending case. The court makes this determination "in equity and good
conscience," guided by factors set forth in Rule 19(b). Rule 19 thus provides
sporadic protection for the absentee's interest. First, the defendant generally will
have no incentive to raise the issue unless she can "get" something, such as a
dismissal. Typically, then, defendants raise the issue only when joinder of the
absentee is not possible-that is, when it will destroy diversity. 9 Second, even
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
56. FED. R CIV. P. 24(a)(2). In addition, the intervenor of right must show that her interest
is not adequately protected by the extant parties. In practice, however, this has been a minimal
requirement. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972).
57. Rule 19 also permits joinder to avoid hollow or incomplete judgments, FED. R. Civ. P.
19(a)(1), and to avoid imposition of double, multiple, or inconsistent obligations on a party
(usually the defendant) because of some interest held by the absentee, id. (a)(2).
58. See 4 FREER, supra note 13, § 19.04, at 19-64.
59. See Scott Paper Co. v. National Cas. Co., 151 F.R.D. 577, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating
that defendant will "not advocate for the interests of others as a matter of altruism").
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if the issue is raised, Rule 19 cannot effect joinder if it would destroy subject
matter jurisdiction.
Traditionally, however, the absentee did not have to rely upon the defendant
and the sporadic protection accorded by Rule 19. Instead, she could intervene of
right under Rule 24(a)(2) and, if herjoinder destroyed diversity of citizenship,
invoke the court's supplemental jurisdiction.6" The exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction in this circumstance permitted vindication of the joinder goal of
avoiding the imposition of harm on the absentee, but also pointed out an anomaly.
Although the absentee was situated identically under Rule 19 and Rule 24, her
joinder could be effected in the pending case only under Rule 24. Put another
way, whether the absentee could actually be joined in the pending case depended
upon who initiated her joinder. If the defendant raised the issue, joinder could not
be achieved because Rule 19 would not invoke supplemental jurisdiction. On the
other hand, if the same absentee in the same predicament intervened,
supplemental jurisdiction would facilitate her joinder.
Many commentators noted the anomaly and called for uniform treatment by
extending supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving joinder under Rule
19.61 To my knowledge, not one commentator urged resolving the anomaly by
denying supplemental jurisdiction for intervention. Nonetheless, Congress did
exactly that and precluded supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases over
claims by persons "seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24."62 The
message has been received; courts routinely now reject supplemental jurisdiction
over claims by intervenors.63
Some have defended the statute in this regard as effecting a minor change
mandated by the "rationale" of Kroger.64 It is a difficult argument to sustain,
however, in part because the opinion in Kroger itself recognized without criticism
that courts routinely permitted supplemental jurisdiction over claims by and
60. See, e.g., Curtis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 754 F.2d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1985); Burger
King Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 F.R.D. 672, 678 (N.D. II1. 1988).
61. See George B. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Courts of Persons Whose
Interest May Be Impaired if Not Joined, 62 F.R.D. 483, 485-87 (1974); Richard D. Freer,
Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1061, 1085-88 (1985); John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal
Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329, 362-63 (1969); Joan Steinman, Postremoval Changes in the Party
Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, The New Law, and Rule 19, 38 U. KAN. L. REV.
864, 950 (1990).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1990).
63. See, e.g., Krueger v. Cartwright, 996 F.2d 928, 933 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Logan Group, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 86, 88-89 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
Distinguished defenders of the statute conclude that it expands supplemental jurisdiction by
permitting the joinder of a defendant who is a co-citizen of the plaintiff under either Rule 24
or Rule 19. See Rowe et al., supra note 12, at 957-58. It is true that nothing in § 1367(b)
precludes joinder of a defendant under either rule, but the statute provides that the plaintiff
cannot assert a claim--even a compulsory counterclaim-back against the newly joined
defendant. Such an assertion is precluded under § 1367(b), because it is a claim by a plaintiff
against one joined under Rule 19 (and the same is true of intervention under Rule 24). See
Krueger, 996 F.2d at 933 & n.6. So it is not clear that joinder of the absentee as a defendant,
even if supported by supplemental jurisdiction, accomplishes much.
64. See Rowe et al., supra note 12, at 955-57; see also supra text accompanying note 41.
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against intervenors of right.6 More importantly, removing supplemental
jurisdiction here (in combination with the historic limitation on supplemental
jurisdiction under Rule 19) leaves the nondiverse absentee without the protection
intended by Rules 19 and 24. Further, because the absentee cannot be joined and
thus cannot be bound by collateral estoppel, her nonjoinder may promote
prolonged duplicative litigation. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming response to
the present § 1367(b) on this point has been critical.66
If the statute is to be amended in this regard, Congress should give serious
consideration to avoiding the anomaly by granting supplemental jurisdiction in
both the Rule 19 and Rule 24 contexts. Politically, an expansion into the
necessary parties area would probably prove difficult because it is contrary to the
historic practice. At the very least, Congress should return to the pre-Finley rule
and permit supplemental jurisdiction over claims by and against intervenors of
right. This should be an easy political "sell." Although this course will resurrect
the anomaly, it will provide protection to the absentees that is now wholly
lacking.
The ALI draft would return to pre-Finley practice, including an important
limitation recognized in case law from the era before passage of present § 1367.
Specifically, supplemental jurisdiction is available over claims by or against
65. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 & n. 18 (1978). It is also
interesting to note that the Court's first recognition of supplemental jurisdiction involved a
claim by a plaintiff-intervenor. See Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (1 How.) 450 (1860).
66. See, e.g., 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1917 (2d ed. Supp. 1998); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, TiM LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 545 & n.42
(5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS]; Arthur & Freer, supra note 54, at 966-74;
Christopher Fairman, Abdication to Academia: The Case of the Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute, 19 SEToN HALL LEGIs. L 157, 185-88 (1994); Marilyn J. Ireland, Supplemental
Jurisdiction Over Claims in Intervention, 23 N.M. L. REV. 57, 72-74 (1993); Denis F.
McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional and Statutory
Analysis, 24 ARIz. ST. L.. 849, 860 (1992); John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the
Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990,
24 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 735, 764-66 (1991).
Moreover, § 1367(b) creates confusion by precluding supplemental jurisdiction over claims
by persons "seeking to intervene as plaintiffs." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (emphasis added). The
language seems to preclude the court from realigning the intervenor to assess jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, some courts have been willing to realign an intervening plaintiff as a defendant
to save jurisdiction. See, e.g., Development Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Hous. & Health Care, Inc., 54
F.3d 156, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1995). Others have not, feeling bound by the intervenor's choice.
See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 88-C4337, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 868
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1996). In one case, which demonstrates the kinds of permutations possible
under the statute, the plaintiff sued for wrongful death of a woman he claimed was his wife.
The woman's mother intervened as a plaintiff to assert wrongful death claims against one
defendant and also to assert that the plaintiff was not the decedent's husband. The court held
that the intervenor was indeed a plaintiff on the wrongful death claim; however, it denied the
intervenor status as a plaintiff on her second claim-the claim asserting that the plaintiff was
not the decedent's husband. The court thus rejected supplemental jurisdiction over the
wrongful death claim but permitted the claim regarding plaintiff's capacity to remain in the
action. See Atherton v. Casey, No. 92-1283, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9976 (E.D. La. June 24,
1992). It would be difficult to devise a less efficient result.
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intervenors of right unless the intervenor would be an indispensable party under
Rule 19(b). In other words, when intervention of right would destroy diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless
it concludes-based upon the analysis of "equity and good conscience" in Rule
19(b)-that it would dismiss the case rather than proceed without joining the
absentee. This exception seems odd, because it allows joinder in those cases in
which the intervenor is merely "necessary" but denies it in those cases in which
the intervenor's interest is more immediate and central. Nonetheless, it may
afford appropriate flexibility to avoid ready evasion of the complete diversity
requirement. 7 Rule 19(b) practice is sufficiently elastic to permit a conclusion
that the absentee is merely necessary when the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction would be ameliorative.6"
C. The Zahn Issue in Class Actions
The Supreme Court has sent conflicting signals regarding invocation of
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction through a class action. In Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur v. Cauble, decided in 1921, the Court held that the citizenship of the
representative-not the class members-is relevant for determining diversity."9
The courts have never seriously questioned the Ben-Hur rule." In Zahn v.
International Paper Co., " decided in 1973, however, the Court held that every
member of the class must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for a
diversity case.
Thus, before § 1367, the law was not logical, but it was certain. All observers
agree that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, on its face, overrules Zahn.
Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction to the full extent of Article III,
which includes claims by class members, so long as the representative's claim
exceeds the amount in controversy and the claims are so closely related as to be
part of the same case or controversy. Section 1367(b) then cuts back on this grant
by precluding supplemental jurisdiction over certain claims in diversity of
citizenship cases. Nowhere in the list of prohibited claims, however, does §
67. See 7 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1610, at 17 (2d ed. Supp. 1998).
68. In analyzing the case under Rule 19(b), the court is permitted to consider whether the
absentee can protect herself, for example, through intervention. If intervention is not permitted
because there would be no supplemental jurisdiction, the court would then look to other Rule
19(b) factors. One of these is whether the plaintiff has a sufficient remedy if the case is
dismissed. Thus, for example, if there were a state court in which all parties and the absentee
could be joined in a single proceeding, the court might easily conclude that the absentee was
indispensable and dismiss the pending case. If there were no such alternative forum, or if other
factors augured toward joinder, the court could conclude that the absentee was merely
necessary, and thus that supplemental jurisdiction was appropriate. In either event, the case can
be funneled to the court best able to resolve the entire dispute.
69. 255 U.S. 356, 365-67 (1921).
70. See also In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 976 (1990) (rejecting the contention that changes in the class action provisions
affected the Ben-Hur rule).
71. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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1367(b) refer to class actions.72 Curiously, the legislative history to the statute
addressed the question directly, and said that the statute was "not intended to
affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class
actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley."73 In other words,
the legislative history embraced the continued vitality of Zahn. Some
commentators felt that the legislative history "fixed" the problem and that Zahn
could be saved.74 Other commentators concluded that the contemporary judicial
emphasis on textualism might preclude use of the legislative history to avoid the
terms of the legislation.75
Not surprisingly, courts have not reached a consensus. The district courts have
split, with most seeming to conclude that Zahn survives.76 On the other hand, the
only appellate court to decide the issue concluded in In re Abbott Laboratories"
that the plain meaning of the statute should govem over contrary legislative
history, so long as the statutory language did not mandate an absurd result.
Because overruling the much-criticized Zahn rule was not absurd, the court
upheld supplemental jurisdiction in a case in which the representative's claim
exceeded the amount in controversy but in which each class member's claim was
limited by state law to $20,000.
Obviously, the split of authority on this issue requires legislative action. I
applaud the ALI proposal for taking the bold step of overruling Zahn and
permitting class actions to proceed when the representative meets the amount in
controversy, regardless of the amount of the class members' claims. There are
several reasons Congress should proceed in this way. First, the majority opinion
in Zahn was not impressive, a fact made brutally clear by Justice Brennan's
strong dissent. Although the pleadings framed the case as one involving
supplemental jurisdiction, the majority failed to address that topic. Instead, it
discussed the inapt issue of claim aggregation.7" It also failed to mention-let
alone distinguish-Ben-Hur, which would seem to have been binding precedent.
72. Apparently, however, Zahn would retain vitality if the class asserted claims against
multiple defendants. In that case, § 1367(b) would preclude supplemental jurisdiction because
the claims are by plaintiffs against persons joined under Rule 20. This is another area of
uncertainty in present practice-why should the availability of supplemental jurisdiction
depend upon the number of defendants joined?
73. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875.
74. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 66, at 972-74; Rowe et al., supra note 12, at 960
n.90.
75. See, e.g., Arthur & Freer, supra note 54, at 981; Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another
Party HeardFrom, 41 EMoRYL,J. 85, 102 (1992); see also, e.g., 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG &
ALBA CoNTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONs § 6.11, at 6-48 to 6-49 (3d ed. 1992).
76. Compare, e.g., Riverside Trans., Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 847 F. Supp. 453,
456 (M.D. La. 1994) (holding that Zahn applies), with Lindsay v. Kvortek, 865 F. Supp. 264
(W.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that Zahn is eviscerated).
77. 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
78. See FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 66, at 214 (stating that "Zahn is a puzzling case,
particularly because of its failure even to consider the argument of three dissenters that recent
principles of ancillary jurisdiction, which had been held to overcome the jurisdictional-amount
requirement in other contexts, should do so also in connection with joinder of parties")
(footnote omitted).
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The overwhelming majority of academic commentary has criticized Zahn.79 In
short, nothing in Zahn warrants unfeigned obeisance.
Second, and more fundamentally, Zahn is not necessary to protect Strawbridge.
The debate over Zahn concerns only the amount in controversy, not the
citizenship of the parties. Indeed, under Ben-Hur, the courts have exercised
supplemental jurisdiction as to citizenship for nearly eighty years. Regardless of
the outcome of the debate over Zahn, the cases affected are disputes between
citizens of different states, consistent with the policy underlying diversity
jurisdiction.
Third, overruling Zahn will better equip federal courts to resolve complex
interstate disputes that may not be well handled in the courts of some states. In
those states that have not adopted Federal Rule 23, it may prove difficult to
maintain a class action in state court.80 Fourth, while one court fears that
overruling Zahn will "allow[] thousands of small claims into federal court via the
class device,"'" the risk of inundation seems quite remote. Presumably, there will
be few cases in which the representative claims more than $75,000 and the class
members have "small claims." Indeed, such cases may be limited to those
involving a statutory limitation such as that in In re Abbott Laboratories.12 If the
class members' claims are substantial, they may well opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3)
class to pursue individual litigation. If they do not, overruling Zahn permits
realization of the economies of the class device. Further, overruling Zahn is
consistent with the notion that class members are not full-fledged parties. For
example, they are not automatically subject to the full panoply of party
discovery. 3 Overruling Zahn may also avoid overlapping class actions in federal
and state court-one involving claims in excess of $75,000 and one involving
claims of less. This result benefits not only the defendant but the societal interest
in efficient administration ofjustice. Finally, experience in those courts that have
concluded that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute abrogated Zahn gives no hint
of a docket crisis.
Overruling Zahn makes good sense. Indeed, it is very curious that the
Congressional Subcommittee Working Papers for what became § 1367 indicated
79. See, e.g., 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1756, at 74-76 (2d ed. 1986); 16 ROBERT C. CASAD ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
106.44, at 106-61 to 106-64.1 (3d ed. 1998); Arthur & Freer, supra note 54, at 1008; Brian
Mattis & James S. Mitchell, The Trouble with Zahn: Progeny of Snyder v. Harris Further
Cripples Class Actions, 53 NEB. L. REV. 137, 191-94 (1974); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond
the Class Action Rule: An Inventory of Statutory Possibilities to Improve the Federal Class
Action, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186, 194 (1996).
80. In Georgia, for example, there is no effective counterpart to the Federal Rule 23(b)(3)
class action.
81. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir.
1996).
82. 51 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1995).
83. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1971)
(holding that class members may, under certain circumstances, be required to submit to
discovery requests).
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a clear intention to overrule Zahn.84 How and why Congress went the other way,
we do not know, but now is a propitious time to do the right thing. Even one
distinguished commentator who favors abolition of diversity jurisdiction supports
the move to overrule Zahn.85
D. The Clark Issue in Nonclass Cases
In Clarkv. Paul Gray, Inc.,8" the Supreme Court held that each plaintiff s claim
in a nonclass case must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for the
invocation of diversity jurisdiction. (In essence, Zahn simply extended the Clark
rationale to claims by members of a class. 7) Just as the language of § 1367(b)
overrules Zahn, so it overrules Clark. For example, assume that one plaintiff
asserts a claim in excess of $75,000 against a diverse defendant, and that a co-
plaintiff (also of diverse citizenship from the defendant) asserts a claim failing to
meet the amount in controversy. Assuming the claims meet the nexus test of
Gibbs,88 § 1367(a) will grant supplemental jurisdiction over the second plaintiff's
claim. Nothing in § 1367(b) removes the grant.89
Still, the novelty of what is essentially pendent parties jurisdiction in a diversity
case, coupled with the legislative history about Zahn, has led to a split of
authority. The only appellate decision is Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press
Mechanical, Inc.,"' in which the Seventh Circuit upheld supplemental jurisdiction
in this situation.
Clark, like Zahn, was an unfortunate opinion that deserves to be overruled. The
Court did not give sufficient consideration to supplemental jurisdiction. As that
doctrine developed in the decades after Clark was decided, however, several
courts came to exercise jurisdiction over a second plaintiff's claim, although it
did not meet the amount in controversy requirement, when it was joined with a
jurisdictionally sufficient claim of another plaintiff. (Of course, the cases required
84. For a discussion, see Karen Nelson Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An
Important but Controversial Supplement to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.L 31, 57 (1992).
85. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 1367 and All That: Recodifying Federal Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 53, 63 (1998).
86. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
87. See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that Zahn "holds that the unnamed class members remain 'parties' for this
purpose").
88. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). They should easily meet the
Gibbs test, because joinder as co-plaintiffs under Rule 20 requires, in addition to the
presentation of a common question of law or fact, that the claims arise from the same
transaction or occurrence. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
89. This assumes that there is a single defendant. If there are multiple defendants, the
second plaintiff's claim would be by a plaintiff against a person joined under Rule 20, and thus
the claim would be prohibited under § 1367(b). As noted in the class action discussion, it
makes no apparent sense that the invocation of supplemental jurisdiction depends on the
number of defendants. See supra note 72.
90. 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
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that the claims be part of the same case or controversy for Article III purposes.9' )
Zahn ended this trend, and the demise of Zahn should rekindle it. For the reasons
discussed with regard to Zahn, then, the revised supplemental-jurisdiction statute
should reject the Clark rule.
Exercising supplemental jurisdiction in this situation avoids overlapping
litigation and the threat of inconsistent results.92 Without supplemental
jurisdiction, the insufficient claim would be filed in state court. The state court
plaintiff cannot be bound by claim or issue preclusion from judgment in the
federal case. Further, the policy of requiring an amount in controversy is not
thwarted by permitting addition of claims, since the underlying claim will satisfy
the amount requirement. Moreover, it is interesting to note that several of the
cases upholding supplemental jurisdiction under the present § 1367 involve
claims by family members.93 While this is an especially compelling situation for
invoking supplemental jurisdiction, the revised statute should not limit its
operation to such cases.94 Also, it seems clear that supplemental jurisdiction here
does not risk serious inundation of the federal courts.9" Indeed, experience with
the practice thus far indicates that there is no caseload problem. There is simply
no principled reason for treating the class and nonclass cases differently on the
amount in controversy issue; this is now a point on which all seem to agree.96
CONCLUSION
It seems clear that § 1367 will be amended. Among the important issues to
reconsider is the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases. The
present statute imposes restrictions that make diversity jurisdiction less effective
and less desirable. While this result may have been proper if the goal of § 1367
were to reduce the diversity docket, Congress never espoused such a goal. The
statute's restrictions against claims asserted by plaintiffs acting in a defensive
capacity and by and against intervenors of right should be scuttled in favor of the
pre-Finley practice. In addition, the expansion of supplemental jurisdiction that
91. See, e.g., Niebuhr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 618, 621 (10th Cir.
1973); Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1970).
92. See FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 66, at 213.
93. See, e.g., Lewis v. Richardson, No. 94-509-JD, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16607 (D.N.H.
Nov. 8, 1995); Patterson Enters., Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1152 (D.
Kan. 1993); Garza v. National Am. Ins. Co., 807 F. Supp. 1256 (M.D. La. 1992) (upholding
supplemental jurisdiction).
94. See FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 66, at 214 ("But if, as is thought, the principle is
sound, there seems no reason to limit it to family cases, since they differ from other cases only
in degree .... ."). In 1969, the ALI proposed a codification of pendent parties jurisdiction for
claims by members of a single family living in the same household. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTrrUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISIoN OF JuIusDIcrIoN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
§ 1301(e) (1969).
95. See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931 (The court remarked that the evisceration of Zahn would
impose a greater burden in class action litigation than would supplemental jurisdiction in the
nonclass case; "[it is therefore easy to imagine wanting to overturn Clark but not Zahn; it is
much harder to imagine wanting to overturn Zahn but not Clark...
96. See Rowe, supra note 85, at 63.
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Congress apparently did not intend but unwittingly created-overruling Zahn and
Clark-has met with approval, and should be codified. Ironically, then, a statute
that at first seemed to hamper joinder in diversity cases may, at the end of the
day, actually expand it.

